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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARCUS W. JOHNSON d/b/a 
l\IARCUS W. JOHNSON 
PLUl\IBING AND HEATING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOE DOCTORMAN, CELIA DOC-
TORMAN and HARRY J. DOC-
TORMAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11442 
APPELLANT''S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The cn::-:c· on a1Jpeal herein involves the question of 
whdher or not it is error for a trial judge to enter judg-
Jll('nt for lllaintiff against defendants based upon find-
iJ1g" ot' fad a11d condnsions of law, and then upon mo-
t:un of d(•frndanh; Yacafr the judgment and re-open the 
c-as(' for furtlHT tei"tirnon~' in ordl'r to enter judgment in 
f'arn1· ot' ddl'mlnnts ancl against plaintiff, thus having 
\lif' '.'f'f(•d of' cfoqJosing of plaintiff's judgment by an ap-
J:<al 11 :tJ1,>;tt h:win<r tlH' controYPI"S'' heard by the Su-
h ·' • 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The above captioned case was tried before the Honor. 
able Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court sitting without a jury. At the conclusion 
of the evidence the trial judge took the matter under ad-
visement, and on l\Iay 7, 1968, granted plaintiff judg-
ment in his favor and against defendants for the sum of 
$2,651.84, representing $2,256.89 as reasonable value of 
his services plus interest of $394.95 and costs. The judg-
ment was based upon findings of fact and conclusions 
of law signed the same day as the judgment. 
Thereafter, counsel for defendants made a Motion 
for New Trial, and after memorandums were submitted 
by counsel for both parties the court made in writing its 
hand written decision which was not filed and upon which 
its Order of November 6, 1968, is based. The written De-
cision is attached to this brief and made a part hereof 
by reference as an appendix. The Decision is a reversal 
of the court's judgment of May 7, 1968, but the Order 
of November 6, 1968 states that the case is re-opened 
for the purpose of further additional testimony. The 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were not strick<-n 
or vacated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The relief sought on appeal is that the Order of 
November 6, 1968 based upon the court's writit:_'n Decision 
dated October 9, 1968 be reversed and the court's judg-
ment of May 7, 1968 be reinstated. 
2 
S'l1ATE~LI£NT OF FACTS 
Deft>ndants are the ff\vners of certain real property 
located at 2910 South Second vVest and 2912 South Sec-
011d West, Salt Lake City, Utah; the building that was 
<'ventnall;' built on property located at 2910 South Second 
\Vl·st vrns commonly known as the Barlow Building, and 
t!te building that was eventually erected at 2912 South 
;-)pcond \Vest ·was commonly called the Johnson Building. 
(R 71) 
Through thPir agent Franz Stangl, defendants were 
iooking for a leaseP to occupy 2912 South Second West 
\\·ith an offrr to build on that site to suit a prospective 
tPnant: howPwr, they ·were not willing to build first and 
thf•11 tincl a tenant after. 
Qnalit:· Constrnction Company of Salt Lake City, of 
\rhielt ~\Ir. Franz Stangl was a principal, was to be the 
~"l1Pral eontrador on both the Johnson and Barlow 
Buildings, nnd plai11tiff, Marcus vV. Johnson, was a sub-
('Ontrador for Quality Constrnction Company in relation 
to tlw doing of the plumbing work on both the Johnson 
antl tlw Barl<n\' Buildings. 
Mr. Franz Stangl discovered a prospect, Marcus W . 
.Tohnson, and after discussions with him obtained his 
s;g·natnrt• 11pon a written agreement for Mr. Johnson to 
!('asp tliv lrnilcling whielt was to be contracted for five 
:-·1 am at $:250 iwr month, ·with some additional oral un-
d1r.<bt,1d ing rPlating to the plans and specifications. 
'l 1!Jt' dd'rn(lants agrt>Pd to give a $3,000 credit on the 
1'<1:t j,, :,Jr .. folrnsnn for certain plumbing work that he 
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agreed to perform on the Johnson Building and the Bar-
low Building that the defendants were going to construct , 
the Johnson Building Leing the one that was to be leased 
to plaintiff. The work performed had n'asonable value 
of $2,256.89, leaving a gain to the plaintiff of $743.11. 
Defendants encountered difficulties in obtaining a 
building permit and in taking care of other preliminar~­
requirement and did not begin construction on the build-
ing until after the date plaintiff ,,-as to take possession. 
namely October 1, 1964. (R 72) 
After the breach of said lPase hy defendants the dl'-
fendants continued with their building plans and opera-
tions and plaintiff did the plumbing work on the John-
son and Barlow Buildings, which plumbing work was 
finally completed and inspected by l\[ay 15, 1965. 
During the period between October 1, 1964 and April 
1, 1965 plaintiffs' lease was tl::'nninated by its own tenu' 
wherein he was leasing from one 0. B. Hanson, and a],out 
December 1, 1904 plaintiff bt>came a month to month 
tenant with an understanding betw<>Pn plaintiff and his 
landlord, 0. B. Hanson, that the said Hanson's premise~ 
would not be satisfactory to the plaintiff and that Hanson 
was looking for a tenant who would find the premis<'' 
suitable. 
The 0. B. Hanson premises \d1ich plaintiff was ot-
cupying would not be suitable any longer for plaintiff 
because the State Road Commission was acquiring prop-
erty for a freeway and intended to acquire part of the 
property which was being nst>d hy plaintiff. During thl' 
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:-:anw pPriod ~Ir. 0. B. Hanson sold to the State of Utah 
lo rt~· (+O) fret of front yard that plaintiff required for 
tlH· prnpl·r 01JPration of his bm;iness. After the purchase 
ot' tlw propPrty h~· the ~tate plaintiff realized that he 
conld lw PxC'!uclt•d from the use of the said property at 
an:: ti111<· and rPalizPd that as soon as the landlord 0. B. 
1 lanson found a iwrrnarn•nt tenant satisfied with the 
:-:mallrr area lJ!aintiff's month to month tenancy would be 
t<'rn1inat<>d. Plaintiff thus fonnd himself insecure with 
n·fen·rn·<· to his location at that time. (R 73) 
l>lll'ing the JH'riod of tinw that plaintiff was occupy-
ing tlw proj)('l't:·: of 0. B. Hanson on a yery tenuous basis, 
(lt-frndants WPl'P far from finished with the constnlCtion 
of tlt!' m>rk on tlw building, and at the time the insecurity 
<l1·Y1,lo1H·d plaintiff eo1mrn•nePd to search for another lo-
"ation and found one, and during the month of April 1965, 
:-:1·c·m<·cl it arnl ahandonPd any intention of occupying the 
lmilding being eonr,;tructPd by defendant. 
Plaintiff aclp1ired a new site for his business before 
tlt<' final insrH•ction of his plumbing work, and apparently 
l11'f'on• h<' finislwd the work on said building. (R 73-74) 
Pursuant to his obligation as a subcontractor of 
Qualit~" Constrnetion Compan~· plaintiff completed the 
pl urnhing \rnrk on tlw Johnson and Barlow Buildings, 
m1cl npon <·01upldion of construction songht payment 
from cldernlants for tlw labor and material on the job. 
n .. ri.11daut:-: rd'us<·d to pa~· plaintiff, claiming that he had 
l1r1·a('li1•d liis lPasp with them. Plaintiff thereafter brought 
:-:nit to c·onqH·l pa~"lllPnt and ddendants counter-claimed 
agai11:-:t him for ln·<'aeh of the lease. 
,) 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Joseph 
G. Jeppson on April 5, 1968. After completion of the trial 
Judge Jeppson found that defendants breached the lease 
agreement with plaintiff by their failure to have tlw 
premises ready on the date indicated in said lease, and 
that plaintiff's action in proceeding to do the plumbing 
work on both the Johnson and Barlow Buildings after 
the breach did not constitute a waiver of the breach by 
defendants, nor did such conduct result in an estoppel 
barring him from claiming the breach by defendants. (R 
74) Based upon this finding the court concluded as a 
matter of law: 
1. That the lease entered into between plaintiff 
and defendants providing for plaintiff to occupy 
a building to made available by defendants by Oc-
tober 1, 1964 was breached by the defendants and 
became invalid because defendants could not d~­
liver possession a.s specified in the lease. 
2. That plaintiff in no way breached said lease nor 
did any of plaintiff's actions result in a waiver b:· 
plaintiff of the breach nor did any of his actions 
estop him from asserting the breach of defendants. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment in hie 
favor and against defendants and each of them in 
the sum of $2,256.89 with interest thereon at six 
( 6%) per cent from May 21, 1965 plus the cost8 
ofthisaction. (R74,75) 
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of plain-
tiff and against defendants on .May 7, 1968 for the total 
sum of $2,651.84 plus costs. (R 70) 
Thereafter defendants made a Motion for New Trial, 
claiming among other things that the court errt>d on 
6 
finding a breach of the lease on the part of defendants 
without also finding repudiation, recision, rejection or 
termination of contract on the part of plaintiff. (R 66-67) 
Defendants' motion was argued and the trial court took 
the matter under advisement, requesting that both parties 
snbmit briefs. As requested briefs were submitted and the 
trial judge made his handwritten Decision which was 
either mailed or delivered to counsel. The decision, which 
provides as follows, \\'as not made part of the court's 
files and records in this case: 
DECISION 
163782 
.JOHN~OX Y~. DOCTORMAN 10/9/68 
DPfendant breached the contract but it was not termi-
nn tecl. 
In continuing with the contract pl. would be entitled 
to thl~ performance of the contract as far as defendant 
J>Prfonns & damagt•s for the breach. 
l >roof 1\·us not taken on plaintiff's damages. The 
Vitse is l'POlH'ned for that purpose. 
Plaintiff brPached & terminated the contract by mov-
iJ1µ: into otlH·r premisPs & abandoning interest in the con-
strndion. l)pf. is entitled to specific performance of the 
h•asl; snhj(·ct to lilaintiff's damages such as credit for 
111ontlts hpfon• hnilcling was ready, costs incid<>ntal to 
rli•laY. 
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For disregarding a general rule see Cox vs. Berry 
Ut. #10744 8/24/67 (sic.) 
It is plaintiff's contention that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment based thereon 
were proper and correct and that the judgment should 
be reinstated. Further, plaintiff contends that the Court'~ 
action in reversing itself upon defendants' Motion for 
New Trial and re-opening the case for additional testi-
mony in relation to plaintiff's damages is improper in 
that it is in the nature of an appeal without adherence to 
the prescribed appellate process. 
ARGUMEN11 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDG-
MENT ENTERED BY IT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
After the parties had presented evidence in support 
of their respective contentions and aftl'r coum;el for the 
parties had completed their argument, the trial judge 
took the matter under advisement. On April 15, 19G8, the 
Court entered ints Minute Order (R 57-GO) stating that 
defendants' had breached the lease hecausl' of fail mt> to 
deliver the premises on the day agreed. The leaf'e lw-
came invalid by this failure on defondants' part. The 
Court found that after the lease was breached by dr-
fendants, they continued with their plans to erect the 
buildings and plaintiff continued to do the plmnhing 
work as a subcontractor of defendants crem•ral contract-o 
or. Each of the parties intended thPr<'after to <'nter into 
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a new lea~w agreem<mt with new tenns to be framed and 
to he effective when entered into, but until that time there 
was no binding lease. (R-58). Accordingly, judgment 
based upon the Minute Order was entered by the Court on 
May 7, 19G8, granting plaintiff judgment against defend-
ants for the sum of $2,2651.84 which represented the 
reasonab]p, value of his services for the plumbing work 
done on both the Johnson and Barlow buildings. 
On May 13, 1968, defendants made a motion to set 
aside and vacate the judgment and grant a new trial or 
in the alternative to make new Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lmv and enter a new judgment or to 
amend the l<'indings. (R 66-68) That motion was argued 
on J nne 28, 1968, after \vhich the Court took the motion 
1mdt-r advisement and directed counsel to submit briefs. 
Authorities of Law were submitted and the Court made 
its writtPn "decision" which was not entered as part of 
UH~ n·cord but which ·was distributed to counsel for the 
parties. 'rlw decision reverses the judgment of the Court 
when•hy judgmt>nt was granted in favor of plaintiff and 
directs that additional testimony will be taken on the 
matter of plaintiff's damages only for purposes of set 
off again::-;t the judgment which defendants will have a-
gainst plaintiff for plaintiff's breach of the lease. The 
order dated November 6, 1968, (R 92) is based upon the 
Courts unentered written decision although it does not 
]lllrport to be so. 
'l1lw Court did not grant a new trial nor did it make 
1ww !findings or Conclusions nor did it amend those 
'' liieh it hacl already entered. However, the Court did, by 
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its handwritten decision, completely reverse the judg-
ment which had been granted to plaintiff after trial of 
the case, and it did so without further testimony being 
taken and without having done so in response to any 
specific motion by defendants. 
It is plaintiff's contention that the action of the trial 
court in reversing the jndgment granted to plaintiff a~ 
was done in this matter constitutes the disposition of th~ 
case by an appeal without having it heard by the appellate 
court of our judicial system. In other words, the trial 
court heard the evidence, accepted exhibits, heard argu-
ment by counsel and entered judgment. Thereafter upon 
a Motion for New Trial by defendants, the case 'vas again 
argued before the trial judge in an effort to have him re-
consider his judgment and to re-try the case. The argu-
ment of the Motion for New Trial amounted to nothing 
more than an appeal to the same court that had grantt·d 
the judgment and with that court sitting as an appellatf' 
court and not granting a new trial or vacating the find-
ings and conclusions but of reversing the judgment which 
had been granted and of taking additional testimony on 
plaintiff's damage only so that any ~wt off plaintiff might 
he entitled to could be deducted from the damages de-
fendant would tw entitled to for breach of the leasP. 
The pertinent provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are as follows: 
(1) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
(i1, a new trial may he granted to all or any of the 
partiPs on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following eanses; pro,-ided, however, that on a 
motion for a n<'w trial in an action tried without 
10 
-
a jury, the court may open the judgment if one 
has be~'n _entered, take additional testimony, a-
mend f mdmgs of fact and conclusions of law, make 
new findings and conclusions and direct the entry 
of a new judgment: 
( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
wrdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
( 7) ~rror in law. 
It is not quite clear whether defendants' Motion for 
a New Trial is based on Rule 59 (a) (6) or 59 (a) (7) or 
both. Iu either case, however, the requirements of the 
rule are that either a new trial be granted or that addi-
tional testimony be taken and thereafter either amended 
or new findings and conclusions be entered and a new 
judgment based thereon. There is no provision in our 
mies for a trial judge to make findings and conclusions, 
(•nter judgment thereon and then leave the findings and 
eonclusions undisturbed and reverse the judgment. 
Th(•fl' can be no question that the granting or deny-
ing of a Motion for New 11i·ial is a discretionary matter 
,,·ith the trial court. U ptou;n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. 
cs. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P. 2d 826. However, the trial 
rnnrt has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a 
:-:howi ng of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59. Tan-
9aro i:s. Jlarn-ro, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P. 2d 390. Here, 
l1owever, thP motion for new trial was not granted. The 
j11dg11wnt was vacated hut the findings of fact and con-
(·lnsions of law were undisturbed. 
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The action of a trial court in granting a motion to 
vacate a judgment is, generally speaking, within the 
judicial discretion of the court. This discretion, howewr , 
is not a loose, arbitrary, and unlicensed jurisdiction, nn-
trammeled by the observance of the methods prescribt>d 
by the law. See 30A Am.Jur. Judgments Rec. 629 l't 8eq. 
Cases where the trial court has opened, modified or 
vacated a judgment have been found but appellant ha~ 
not been able to find any case where the trial court re-
versed its judgment without making new findings of fact 
or conclusions of law or without having vacated tlw judg-
ment and having taken additional evidence upon '.Vhich to 
make new findings and judgment. 
Appellant feels that the proceeding in which the in-
stant judgment was reversed tantamount to the trial 
court setting as an appellate court on its own judgment 
and was not a proceeding for a new trial under thP lm1-
vi sions of Rule 59. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFF BREACHED ITS LEASE WITH DEFENDANTS. 
Appellant incoqwrated by reference the fact::; and 
argument as they may be iwrtinent into Part 11 of this 
brief. 
As a general ntlP the imrt,- first <ruilh of a snh-
' ·' b . 
stantial hrearh of a contract cannot complaint if tlw otlwr 
party thereafter refuses to rwrYorrn. !lilperi((l F. J11s. Co. 
]2 
vs. Coo.s County, 151, U.S. 452, 38 L. Ed. 231, 14 S. Ct. 
379;Nakdimen vs. Baker (C.A. 8 Ark.) 111 F 2d 778; 
Dalton vs. Mullins (Ky.) 293 S.W. 2d 470; Buckman vs. 
Hill Military Academy, 190 Or. 194, 223 P. 2d 172. 
He can neither imist on performance by the other party, 
nor maintain an action against the other party for sub-
sequent failnre to perform. Loudenback Fertilizer Co. vs. 
Tcnnes.see Phosphate Co. (C.A. 6) 121 F. 298; Buckman 
cs. Ihll Military Acadcniy, supra, Lynch vs. McDonald, 
12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P. 2d ±64. 
One -who first wrongfully violates a contract has no 
standing in court to recover for the violation of the con-
tract by the otht>r party thereto. Yazoo & M. Valley R. 
Co. t'S. Scarle.s, 851\Iiss. 520, 37 So. 939. 
Where a contract is not performed, the party who 
is guilt,\' of the first breach is generally the one upon 
whom rests all the liability for the non-performance. 
An1..'ll :llin. Co. 1·s. Humble, 153 U.S. 540, 38 L. Ed. 814, 
14 S. Ct. 876. 
It is also trne that a party who has himself been 
guilty of the first substantial breach of contract cannot 
rPscind tlw contract because of the subsequent refusal or 
failure b.\- the other iiarty to perform. See Williston, Con-
tracts 3 ]j~d., SPcs. 812 et seq. Also 17 Am. Jnr. 2d, Secs. 
3G;), 425. 
'rhe trial conrt found that defendants breached the 
lPasr, that the breach was material and that plaintiff 
was damaged thereby. BPcause of defendants' material 
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breach they cannot compel performance of the lease by 
plaintiff or seek damages for his non-performance. 
Defendants claim that the trial court could not find 
a breach of the contract on the part of defendants with-
out also finding repudiation, rescission, rejection or t('r-
mination of the contract on the 1mrt of plaintiff. S11ch 
a position is not based on the lm,-. 
Repudiation, rejection and rescission are all ways of 
terminating a contract. So, however, is faithful compk•-
tion of the contract by the parties. However, n•scis:;;iu11 
terminates the contract and put::; the parties back in the 
position they were in before the contract was entered 
into and does not concern itsl·lf with damages. vVlwrea~. 
a breach of the eontract hy only one party relieves th1" 
other of performing and also entitles him to damagt~. 
Here, plaintiff was not seeking a rescission of tlw con-
tract and defrndant could not seek a n•scission heeause 
of tlw mate>rial hrt>ach of the lease. Therefore a finding 
hy the court of rescission, rejection or re1mdiation of 
the contract plus a breach wonld haY<> been error. 
The very idea of rescinding a contract implil•d that 
what has been parted with shall bl~ restored on both side~. 
and henee the general rule, which is to he n•asonabl:1 ap-
plied is that a party ·who wishPs to rescind n contraf't 
must place the ovposite party in statns quo. S<:•e 17 Arn. 
.Jnr. :2d Contracts, St•c. 512 et ::wq. and the easl'S thP11 
cited. 
An attempted re::;toration of tlw status quo is an 
essential part of tl1e rescission of a eontrnd, and in ac-
14 
cordance with the general rule requiring restoration, a 
party cannot rescind and at the same time retain the con-
sideration, or a part of the consideration, received under 
the contract. See 166 A.L.R. 394. 
If the defendant has failed altogether to perform an 
essential part of an entire contract, the plaintiff may re-
store what he has received, and for sake of the remedy 
treat the contract as rescinded. Luey vs. Bundy, 9 N.H. 
298. 
CONCLUSION 
It should be obvious that a breach of a contract gives 
rise to a cause of action on the part of the party not 
breaching and also excuses non-performance thereafter 
by him. He may rescind the contract, restore the con-
sideration and desire to be placed in the position both 
parties were in before the contract was entered into, or 
he may sue for damages and be excused from perform-
ance thereafter. 
The trial court could not, as defendants contend, be 
compelled to find rescission of the contract coupled ·with 
a finding of breach, but would have to find only one. As 
a practical matter the result to defendants in this case 
wonld he the same, for they lost their right to compel 
performance by plaintiff or to treat the contract as srtill 
b0ing in existt~nce because of their breach. 
Plaintiff's damages because of defendants' breach 
of the lease was the reasonable value of the plumbing 
sc·rvices p(_'rformed by him. By breaching the lease the 
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defendants thereby lost the right to compel plaintiff to 
perform, the measure of plaintiff's damages is the 
reasonable value of his services for the plumbing he pPr-
formed. 
If the plumbing performed by plaintiff is lield to be 
consideration for the lease then dt>fendants' breach of 
the contract is sufficient reason for the conrt to find the 
contract terminated and rPtnrn plaintiff's consideration 
to him and it is not necessary for the trial court to find 
both a breach and rescission of the contract as claimed 
by dtifendants, but a finding of tiither one is proper under 
the law. 
Further the action of the trial C'Ourt in reversing the 
judgment entered after the compltition of the trial had 
the effect of allowing defrndants an appeal ·without fol-
lowing proper appellate procedure. 
Plaintiff respectfully pray::; the court to reinstate 
the judgment entered by the trial court on l\Iay 7, 19GS, 
and to revtirse the Orel Pr of the trial court dated N onrn-
her 6, 1968, based on its unfiled handwrittPn dt>cision. 
Respectfully submitted 
Kipp and Chri::;tian 
D. Gary Christian 
Hi 

